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DRAFT
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ABSTRACT
In December of 2015, the Department of Defense announced its decision to allow women into
combat roles. Many applauded this decision as a huge victory for gender equality in the United
States. However, there still remains one formal barrier to gender equality in the U.S. military,
the bar on female registration for the draft. This comment will argue that in order for American
women to share the burdens of citizenship with their male peers, they must also be required to
register for the draft. However, this comment will also argue that in order to protect the important
State interest in the wellbeing of children and families, a parenthood exception should be added
to allow both mothers and fathers to opt out of registering with the Selective Service System. To
do so would respect the mandates of the Equal Protection clause, allow women to share the burden
of citizenship, and protect children and families.
This comment will compare the United States and Israeli militaries, and will engage in a
comparative analysis of equality principles in each nation’s legal system. In making these
comparisons, the comment will highlight how the Israeli system of conscription and legal principles
of equality do little to further equality for Israeli women in the military. This will show why the
U.S. should not distinguish between men and women when it comes to the draft. It will also show
why the Equal Protection clause mandates registration requirements for both men and women.

* Kylie Hanlon is the Managing Editor of Communications of the Journal of
Law and International Affairs and a 2020 Juris Doctor Candidate at The
Pennsylvania State University School of Law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Women’s service in the military has always been a point of
contention in American society. Most recently, the debate flared over
whether women should be allowed into the military’s combat arms
positions. Those in favor saw it as another major step towards
women’s equality in the United States and a way to recognize the
hundreds of women who have served in such roles informally since
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.1 That debate largely ended in
December of 2015 when the Department of Defense announced its
decision to fully integrate the United States military and allow women
into combat roles.2 However, the Selective Service System still remains
a formal barrier to gender equality in the United States military.
The Selective Service System has undergone many changes
throughout U.S. history.3 However, the Selective Service System, as it
is known today, was formed in 1980 under the Military Selective
Service Act (“MSSA”).4 The Act requires all male citizens, and
residents of the United States, between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-six to register with the Selective Service System—an
independent agency that oversees registration and implementation of
the draft.5 However, the United States has not drafted a man into

Erin R. Goldberg, A Sisterhood of Arms: Envisioning Conscription and Selective Service
Post-Gender Integration of Combat Arms, 64 BUFFALO L. REV. 1135 (2016). See also
Gabrielle Fromer, With Equal Opportunity Comes Equal Responsibility: The
Unconstitutionality of a Male-Only Draft, GEO. J. GENDER & L. 173, 194 (2017).
(discussing women’s roles in combat during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan).
2
Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1137.
3
Fromer, supra note 1, at 180-82.
4
Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3801 (2016) (West, Westlaw
through Pub. 114-254), Formerly cited as 50 App. USC § 451. See also Goldberg, supra
note 1, at 1143.
5
Fromer, supra note 1, at 182.
1
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military service since 1972, 6 making the Selective Service System largely
a symbolic requirement of full citizenship.7
In theory, the purpose of the Selective Service System is to
“provide military manpower in a manner that is administratively
manageable.”8 But the Selective Service System and the draft also serve
two further purposes. First, the draft is supposed to instill a civic
responsibility in American men and is a means for men to fulfill their
“moral responsibility” to serve their country.9 Second, the Selective
Service System is a way to connect the civilian world to the military,
grounding the military institution to make it more tangible for the
average American male.10 As General George S. Patton put it, “[t]he
soldier is the Army. No army is better than its soldiers. The soldier is
also a citizen. In fact, the highest obligation and privilege of citizenship
is that of bearing arms for one’s country.”11 By excluding women from
draft availability and Selective Service registration, the government is

6
Elizabeth Farrington, Gender-Selective Service: The History and Future of Women
and the Draft, 39 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 279 (2017). See also William A.
Kamens, Selective Disservice: The Indefensible Discrimination of Draft Registration, 52 AM. U.
L. REV. 703, 705, 707 (2003), discussing the unlikelihood of the United States
reinstituting a draft since no draft has been declared since Selective Service
registration began again in 1981.
7
Jill Elaine Hasday, Fighting Women: The Military, Sex, and Extrajudicial
Constitutional Change, 93 MINN. L. REV. 96, 104 (2008). See also Dunn, The Military’s
Selective Service Act’s Exemption of Women, at 10, (quoting Memorandum from General
David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense
(Dec. 4, 1981)) (“the act of registration has tended to remind [young men] . . . of the
obligation of citizenship and helps to rekindle pride in service and country.”).
8
Maj. Scott E. Dunn, The Military Selective Service Act’s Exemption of Women: It
is Time to End it, 2009-APR ARMLAW 1, 9 (2009).
9
Id. at 12.
10
Id. See also Leah Kaufman, We Want You: Constitutionality of Conscription in
the United States and Israel, 37 WHITTIER L. REV. 193, 202 (2016) (discussing how the
volunteer-based military has created a disconnect between those who serve and the
American public and how some form of compulsory service may remedy this
disconnect).
11
Renee Just, GI Jane: A Comparison of the Legal Framework for Women’s Military
Service in Israel and the United States, 8 CREIGHTON INT’L & C OMP. L. J. 165 (2017)
(quoting General George S. Patton).
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signaling to women that their moral obligation to public service is not
as important as that of their male counterparts. 12
Furthermore, the Department of Defense has acknowledged
that there is no military reason for not registering women for the
draft.13 At the time the Supreme Court first examined women’s draft
exclusion in Rostker v. Goldberg,14 “the Department of Defense already
recognized the need for draft-eligible support personnel and had
recognized women’s ability to fill these roles.”15 Yet despite this
support, paternalistic views that women were the weaker sex, best
suited for domestic life prevailed and the challenge to women’s draft
exclusion was rejected.16
In contrast to women’s draft exclusion in the American
military, Israel’s service requirements and exemptions provide a strong
example of why American service laws should not distinguish between
men and women. “From an international perspective, Israel presents
an iconic view of women soldiers and the progressive inclusion of
women in the military.”17 Like the United States, Israel allows women
into most combat positions, and more significantly, has a longstanding
practice of conscripting both men and women into armed service.18
However, due to how the service laws in Israel distinguish between
men and women, as of 2011, only thirty-three percent of the Israel

12
See Fromer, supra note 1, at 193 (arguing that exclusion from Selective
Service registration sends the message that women are subordinate to men due to
their gender).
13
Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1156.
14
453 U.S. 57 (1981).
15
Id. at 1155.
16
See id. at 1147.
17
Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Cross-Dressers with Benefits: Female Combat Soldiers in
the United States and Israel, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 321, 323-24 (2012).
18
Catherine Powell, Another Barrier Falls: United States Joins Group of Countries
That Open Doors to Women in Combat, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Dec. 17,
2015), https://www.cfr.org/blog/another-barrier-falls-united-states-joins-groupcountries-open-doors-women-combat. Some commentators have even described the
conscription of women into the IDF as a social anomaly in Israel. Guy I. Seidman &
Eyal A. Nun, Women, The Military and the Court: Israel at 2001, 11 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN’S STUD. 91, 94 (2001).
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Defense Force (“IDF”) is female.19 This disparity between female and
male service in the IDF, despite service obligations for both, is due to
the shorter service obligations for women and the many exemptions
available to them to avoid mandatory service.20 Such exemptions are in
place to protect women’s roles as mothers, but instead of protecting
women, such exemptions work to their detriment.
Therefore, this comment will argue that in order for American
women to achieve full citizenship they must be required to register
with Selective Service System and be subject to the draft, like their male
peers. However, in order to protect the important State interest in the
wellbeing of children and families, this comment will also argue that a
parenthood exception should be added to allow both mothers and
fathers to opt out of registering with the Selective Service System. To
do so will give full weight to the Equal Protection Clause, allow women
to share the burden of citizenship, and protect children and families.
In Part II, I will discuss the respective militaries of Israel and
the United States. I will examine the histories of each nation’s military,
the role of women in the militaries, seminal cases regarding women’s
roles in the military, and the aftermath of such cases. In Part III, I will
examine the principles of equality that can be found in both U.S. and
Israeli law and how interpretations of equality developed in each
nation. In Part IV, I will argue why the Equal Protection Clause
mandates that women register with the Selective Service System and
why a parenthood exemption would be in the best interest of the State,
as well as why such an exemption must be applied to both mothers
and fathers in order to avoid discriminatory results, like the ones seen
in Israel.

19
Powell, supra note 18. See also Ukeles, supra note 17, at 324 (“Although
legally permitted to engage in even direct combat roles, Israeli women very rarely
engage in combat support roles, are completely absent as infantry, and have advanced
insignificantly in military leadership.”),
20
Powell, supra note 18. See also Daphne Barak-Erez, The Feminist Battle for
Citizenship: Between Combat Duties and Conscientious Objection, 13 CARDOZO J. L. &
GENDER 531, 533 (2007).
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II. ISRAEL’S AND THE UNITED STATES’ MILITARIES
A. The Israeli Military
1. History of the Israeli Defense Force
Two weeks after Israel declared its independence, and in the
height of the War of Independence, the Israeli Defense Force (“IDF”)
was created on May 26, 1948. 21 The founding document declared that
the IDF would be Israel’s military force and required that all IDF
soldiers pledge their allegiance to the protection of Israel, similar to the
oath given to American soldiers when enlisting.22 The founding
document of the IDF is significant because until that time, the War of
Independence was being fought by various paramilitary groups
without a clear organizing structure.23 The creation of the founding
document therefore dissolved those groups and united them all under
the direction and coordination of the IDF.24
It was not until the War of Independence was won that the
Defense Service Law was passed, which detailed the recruitment
protocols and service exemptions for the IDF.25 At the time, the
Defense Service Law was seen as revolutionary because it made
military service mandatory for both men and women.26 However, the
law was not a complete commitment to gender equality due to the
special exemptions and shorter service requirements provided for
women.27 In essence, the Defense Service Law has remained largely
the same since its enactment with several amendments throughout the
years, with the current version of the law seeing its last revision in
1986.28

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Kaufman, supra note 10, at 203.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 203-04.
Barak-Erez, supra note 20, 534.
Id. at 534-35.
Kaufman, supra note 10, at 204.
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In practice, there are three different categories of military
service under the Defense Service Law: entry level or compulsory
service, the reserves, and professional or technical service.29 At the
entry level, service is set by statute, mandating three years of service
for men and two years for women,30 beginning once the individual
turns 18.31 However, mandatory service is not universal because the
statute only conscripts Jewish men and women.32 Further, men
comprise most of the conscripts, constituting about two-thirds of
those who are conscripted.33
After this initial entry level, soldiers can be discharged from the
IDF having completed their military service.34 Most men, however, are
given the opportunity to be moved to reserve units and to be called
upon periodically based on the needs of the IDF—an opportunity not
typically afforded to women.35 In addition to the option to serve in the
reserve forces, some soldiers, based on their perceived usefulness to
the IDF, are asked to continue their service in the professional or
technical area of the IDF.36
The significance of the professional or technical area of the
military for women is twofold. First, it can act as an equalizer between
men and women in reducing the effects of the unequal terms of
service. Second, service in the professional army is typically for full pay;
meaning women can make more money than they would in the civilian
sector and begin earning it before their male peers.37
It is also important to note the significance of the IDF in Israeli
society. The IDF is central to Israeli society because, since its
inception, Israel has been surrounded by countries that pose serious
and consistent military threats.38 Given this security situation, Israel
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Seidman & Nun, supra note 18, at 95.
Id.
Just, supra note 11, at 177.
Seidman & Nun, supra note 18, at 97-98.
Just, supra note 11, at 177.
Seidman & Nun, supra note 18, at 99.
Id.
Id. at 100.
Id.
Kaufman, supra note 10, at 205.
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will likely always be heavily reliant on a large number of soldiers.39
Therefore, it is essential to integrate Israeli youths into society through
military service because “without each and every one of them, Israel
would not be able to defend itself successfully against attacks.”40
Further, “[t]he close identification of the military with the State gives
the military the kind of influence and privilege rarely enjoyed by other
social institutions.”41 For many draftees military service, in particular,
service in combat units, helps to further their political and private
careers and is often a ticket “to elite status in Israeli political, public,
and business circles.”42 Therefore, the different terms of service
between men and women can have ramifications that reach beyond
their military service.43
2. The Role of Women in the Israeli Military
a.

The History of Women’s Service in the IDF

Whether formally or informally, Israeli women have served in
the armed forces since before the inception of the Israeli State, most
notably during the War of Independence.44 Yet despite this tradition
of service, at the end of the War of Independence, a debate waged on
whether there was a place for women in the IDF.45 The debate resulted
in a compromise. In 1949 it was determined that women would be
conscripted along with their male peers, 46 but there would be a number

Id.
Id.
41
Seidman & Nun, supra note 18, at 113.
42
Id. at 113-114.
43
”Many [soldiers] establish contacts or networks in the army that lead to
jobs and careers. . . . As a result, military service has taken on enormous importance
in the professional lives of Israeli citizens who essentially begin their careers in the
military institution.” Leora F. Eisenstadt, Privileged but Equal? A Comparison of U.S. and
Israeli Notions of Sex Equality in Employment Law, 40 Vand, J. Transnat’l L. 357, 377
(2007).
44
Seidman & Nun, supra note 18, at 111.
45
Id. at 111-12.
46
Id. at 112 (“[T]he main reason for the somewhat surprising decision to
integrate women in most units of the military . . . was the extreme manpower
shortage during the War of Independence.”).
39
40
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of exemptions available to women to opt out of service so that their
place as wives and mothers could be protected.47
While women could not be conscripted into combat roles,
theoretically women could volunteer for such positions. 48 However,
such an option was not seen in practice.49 In reality, women were
placed to auxiliary roles, like clerical staff, with a few positions in
technical and professional roles.50 The shorter service terms—the
special limitations placed on women’s service—”affect[ed] their
chances of inclusion and promotion in the standing army.”51 While the
special exemptions were put in place to protect women’s essential roles
as mothers, in reality, those privileges worked to the detriment of
women’s inclusion in the military.52
In the 1970s and 1980s, some progress was made towards
equalizing women’s status in the military.53 The IDF began placing
women into instructor positions where they would teach classes of
male combat soldiers, in particular classes involving technical duties
that typically dealt with missiles, artillery, and armor. 54 Women were
also placed as simulator instructors, where they were given the
opportunity to teach air and naval combat soldiers.55 However, these
changes were made with the intention to free up more men to fill
combat roles.56 In essence, up until the 1990s, women’s service in the
IDF was dictated by practical considerations; when women were

Id. In order to protect women’s primary duty to serve as wives and
mothers, women are exempted from mandatory service if they are married, mothers,
or pregnant, as well as exemptions from service for conscientious objection.
Eisenstadt, supra note 43, at 378.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Barak-Erez, supra note 20, at 540.
51
Id.
52
Eisenstadt, supra note 43, at 378-79.
53
Seidman & Nun, supra note 18, at 114.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
47
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needed, they were called up, and when not needed, women were largely
sheltered from the burdens of service.57
b.

Miller v. Minister of Defense

The first major challenge to women’s exclusion from combat
roles in the Israeli armed forces came in Miller v. Minister of Defense.58
Up until Miller, women soldiers typically served in clerical roles and
occasionally in technical and professional roles.59 In particular, it had
been the IDF’s policy to not allow women into combat roles, like the
prestigious pilots course for the Israeli Air Force, regardless of their
qualifications.60 In 1993, despite this policy, Alice Miller hoped to
volunteer for the pilots course.61 At that time, Miller already possessed
a South African pilot’s license and was studying aerospace engineering
at Israeli Institute for Technology. This arguably made her qualified to
serve in the Israeli Air Force.62 However, the IDF denied Miller’s
application, stating that fighter-pilots fell under the category of combat
positions forbidden to women.63
In response, Miller appealed to the High Court of Justice, the
Israeli equivalent of the Supreme Court. Miller sought an injunction
that would require the military authorities to allow her to take the tests
necessary to enter the pilots course, and upon passage, enter the
course.64 Essentially, Miller was not attacking any fundamental
legislation, simply the military policy of exclusion.65 The military,

Id.
HCJ 4541/94, Miller v. Minister of Defense, 49(4) PD 94 [1995] (Isr.).
59
Barak-Erez, supra note 20, at 540.
60
Ukeles, supra note 17, at 328.
61
Seidman & Nun, supra note 18, at 115.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 116.
64
Id.
65
Ukeles, supra note 17, at 328. “[Miller’s] petition did not question the
statutory arrangements applying to women’s service and, in fact, could not challenge
their binding validity due to the constitutional tradition of the legislature’s
sovereignty. It was confined to attacking the policy of the army, which rejected the
possibility of volunteering for duties that had not been defined as open to women.”
Barak-Erez, supra note 20, at 541-42.
57
58
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however, argued that the ban on women in the fighter pilot’s course
was not a matter of discrimination for two reasons.66
First, the prohibition was the result of the applicable legal
standards and necessity.67 At the time, service in the Israeli Air Force
required a voluntary extension of service and frequent and extensive
reserve duty.68 Therefore, the military argued that due to women’s
shortened compulsory service, the age-cap on recruitment into the
reserves, and the prohibition from requiring mothers to serve in the
reserves; women could not be counted on to complete the reserve time
they initially volunteered for.69 As a result, the military would then have
to train a higher number of fighter-pilots in order to maintain the
needed number of pilots at all times; which would be cost-prohibitive
due to the exorbitant cost of training.70 Second, the military argued,
even if the court were to disagree with the military’s arguments, this
was a matter best left for the legislature to decide, not the military or
the courts.71
Ultimately, in a decision three to two, the court ruled that the
policy barring women from fighter-pilot training was discriminatory,
declared the policy void, and ordered the military to integrate women
into fighter-pilot training.72 In regards to the Defense Service Law,73
the court acknowledged that the statute did make distinctions between
men and women, however, the court found that the statute did not
encourage or justify discrimination against women.74 One Justice even
argued that sex-based discrimination of the type, in this case, affronted

Seidman & Nun, supra note 18, at 117.
Id.
68
Ukeles, supra note 17, at 329-30.
69
Seidman & Nun, supra note 18, at 116-17.
70
Id. at 117. At the time of Miller, the over-all cost of training a single fighterpilot was estimated to be over one million US dollars.
71
Id. at 117-18.
72
Id. at 118.
73
Defense Service Law, 1949, 1 L.S.I. 112, (1949).
74
Seidman & Nun, supra note 18, at 118.
66
67
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human dignity.75 Therefore, the military policy should work towards
greater gender equality where possible.76
The court also rejected the military’s arguments concerning
logistics and budgetary concerns.77 In rejecting these arguments, the
court determined that the military’s position rested only on
hypothetical concerns about the cost of retaining women without any
evidence.78 Even if integrating women into the fighter-pilot course
proved to be expensive, the court found that in a democratic society
such as Israel’s the society must be prepared to bear the burden of
gender equality.79
Even though the ultimate holding of the case was to allow
Miller entry into the fighter-pilot’s course, Miller subsequently did not
pass the entry process requirements and was disqualified.80 Yet despite
Miller’s failure to achieve her own aspirations, the ruling has been
hailed as a feminist achievement.81 First, the ruling removed a form of
gender discrimination in an arena that has significant symbolic
importance in Israel.82 Second, the ruling encouraged the military to
begin opening more positions to women and broaden the assignment
of women in reserve forces as well. 83 Third, the Miller ruling influenced
the legislature to include an amendment to the Equal Rights for
Women Law regarding equal rights in the army, as well as a similar
provision in the Defense Service Law.84

Ukeles, supra note 17, at 336.
Seidman & Nun, supra note 18, at 118.
77
Id.
78
Barak-Erez, supra note 20, at 543.
79
Seidman & Nun, supra note 18, at 119.
80
Id. at 120.
81
Barak-Erez, supra note 20, at 543.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 544. “The [Equal Rights for Women Law] was amended in January
2000 to state that women-soldiers have rights equal to that of any male-soldier in
carrying out any task in their military service except, where the essence and character
of the role preclude women from carrying out its essential tasks.” Siedman & Nun,
supra note 14, at 128. The Defense Service Law was amended to include Amendment
11, “Equality in Service,” which “grants full equality to women in fulfilling their
military service, with one qualification: the military is permitted to refuse to appoint
75
76
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B. The United States’ Military
1. From Minute Men to an All-Volunteer Force
While the United States’ military is an all-volunteer force today,
that has not always been the case. During the colonial period, the
colonies adopted a militia system similar to the one used in England.85
The militia system required all men, between the ages of sixteen and
sixty, to be armed and ready to serve at any moment. 86 Typically, the
colonial governments would set quotas for each military district, with
militiamen serving within their respective colonies for up to three
months.87 If a campaign was expected to last longer than three months,
volunteers would be taken.88
During the Revolutionary War, the old colonial militia system
became more stringent. Due to the need for more soldiers, the
Continental Congress increased training days, limited exemptions,
implemented more fines, and increased the terms of service to a
maximum of three years.89 The Continental Congress then assigned
quotas to each state and it was up to the states to meet the quotas.90
The Civil War was the first time a successful national draft was
implemented.91 Even then the draft’s reach was minimal. 92 Draftees
made up only about 50,000 to 100,000 men of the 2.5 million Union
Force.93 It was not until 1916, when Congress enacted the National

a woman to a military role if demanded by the nature and characteristics of that
particular role.” Karin Tamar Schafferman, Milestones in Legislation and Judgements, THE
ISRAEL DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE, (Mar. 5, 2008), https://en.idi.org.il/articles/9786.
85
Kaufman, supra note 10, at 195.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 197.
90
Id.
91
Kamens, supra note 6, at 710.
92
Id. at 711 (“Although conscription during the civil war was an emotionally
charged issue, in actuality, the number of drafted men who served was relatively
negligible”).
93
Id.
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Defense Act, that a comprehensive draft policy was created.94 The
National Defense Act allowed for an expansion of the army and also
enabled the President to draft soldiers if the recruitment system failed
to attract sufficient volunteers.95
Later, in response to the growing threat posed by Germany,
the federal government again enacted the draft in 1940,96 which existed
for the next thirty years.97 Unlike previous drafts however, this draft
allowed the President to provide exemptions for public health and
safety, which tended to favor married men and farm workers.98 As a
result, ten million men were drafted between 1940 and 1946. 99 In 1948,
facing the growing threat of communism, Congress passed the Military
Selective Service Act (“MSSA”) to begin a peacetime draft.100 The draft
was in effect until 1950, when the Korean War started. However, the
act was not substantially changed during that time, it was only amended
in 1951 to meet the needs of the war effort.101 The amended act
continued many of the same exemptions used during World War II,102
and drafted over 1.5 million men into service.103
It was not until the Vietnam War that the draft became a focal
point of public discourse. At that time, sixteen percent of the military
was draftees, and of the men sent to Vietnam, eighty-eight percent
came from the sixteen percent draft group.104 Further, it became
increasingly clear to the public that wealthy and well-connected young
men were able to take advantage of more draft deferments than their

Kaufman, supra note 10, at 198 (discussing comments made by Army
Colonel Oliver Spaulding, applauding the passage of the Act for creating a more
organized and comprehensive draft policy).
95
Id.
96
Id. at 199.
97
Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1141.
98
Kaufman, supra note 10, at 199
99
Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1142.
100
Dunn, supra note 8, at 8.
101
Id.
102
Kaufman, supra note 10, at 199
103
Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1142.
104
Kaufman, supra note 10, at 199.
94

328

2020

Sharing the Burden of Citizenship

8:1

poor, working-class peers.105 This resulted in heightened resistance to
the draft. Due to the growing resistance, the last draft lottery was held
in December 1972, with the draft law expiring in 1973. 106
In 1980, despite only a brief five-year hiatus, draft registration
resumed107 in response to the Soviet Union’s invasion of
Afghanistan.108 President Carter believed that in resuming the MSSA,
“[r]egistration . . . will improve our capacity . . . to increase the size and
strength of our Armed Forces—and that capacity will itself help to
maintain peace and to prevent conflict.”109 While President Carter
requested that the MSSA be amended to include a registration
requirement for women, Congress ultimately provided for a male-only
Selective Service System.110 Congress chose to reject President Carter’s
request out of fears of the cost of including women, women’s
exclusion from combat, and the societal impact of including women.111
Since that time Congress’ concerns have remained largely unchallenged
resulting in a largely unchanged male-only registration requirement.112
Now with threats of the draft falling farther into the past, the
United States’ All Volunteer Force (“AVF”) has grown into a highly
respected institution,113 totaling around 1.4 million servicemembers.114
The AVF’s focus has evolved from merely obtaining as many ablebodied personnel as possible to focusing on “attracting and retaining
talented people to fill increasingly specialized roles in a smaller and
more efficient military.”115 In order to better respond to disturbances
around the world, AVF planning emphasizes rapid deployment of
105
Id. See also Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1142 (discussing how young, wealthy
white men became the voices of draft resistance, largely excluding the voices of their
poor and minority peers).
106
Id. at 1143.
107
Id.
108
Dunn, supra note 8, at 9.
109
Farrington, supra note 6, at 290.
110
Dunn, supra note 8, at 8.
111
Fromer, supra note 1, at 184.
112
Dunn, supra note 8, at 10.
113
Kamens, supra note 6, at 722 (discussing how the military has improved
its image since the late 1970s and early 1980s).
114
Id. at 729.
115
Id. at 723.
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smaller forces in strategic places,116 with an emphasis on “rapid
strategic response, containment, coalition building and setting limited
goals.”117 These developments have created drastically different armed
forces in the United States than the armed forces of the past.118 As the
form and function of the U.S. military evolve, so too should the role
of women in the military.
2. The Role of Women
a.

The History of Women’s Role in the Military

While women have played a role in the United States military
throughout history, the first permanent position for women in the
armed forces was not created until 1901 when Congress created the
Army Nurse Corps.119 During World War II, Congress also created a
temporary Women’s Army Corps (“WAC”).120 After World War II, the
passage of the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948
brought the first significant integration of women into the military.121
However, the act placed significant limitations on women’s
service. The act specified that women could comprise only two percent
of the military; excluded women from draft registration, the draft,
upper-level officer ranks, as well as combat positions; and allowed for
involuntary discharge for motherhood and pregnancy.122 In 1967,
Congress removed some of the limitations on women’s service by
removing the two percent cap and opening all upper-level officer ranks
to women.123

Id. at 729.
Id. at 728.
118
Id. at 722 (discussing a number of forces that have shaped the
development of the United States military).
119
Major Jeffrey S. Dietz, Breaking the Ground Barrier: Equal Protection Analysis
of the U.S. Military’s Direct Ground Combat Exclusion of Women, 207 Mil. L. Rev. 86, 93
(2011).
120
Id.
121
Id. at 94.
122
Hasday, supra note 7, at 105-06.
123
Dietz, supra note 119, at 94.
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The greatest change to women’s role in the armed services
came during the 1970s thanks in part to the growing women’s rights
movement and the elimination of the draft.124 During that time, while
the number of overall enlistment had decreased, the number of activeduty women increased to over 120,000. 125 By 1972, women could
participate in the Air Force, Army, and Navy Reserve Officer Training
Corps (“ROTC”)126 and in 1976, women were allowed into the military
academies.127 Women were also qualified for noncombat aviation in
the next year.128
b.

Rostker v. Goldberg — The Court’s Rejection of Drafting Women

In 1980, the role of women in the military came to the
forefront of American politics when President Carter requested that
the MSSA be amended to include women.129 While Congress rejected
President Carter’s request to include women in the amended MSSA,
the Supreme Court added its voice to the debate in 1981. In its opinion
in Rostker v. Goldberg,130 the Court discussed the issue of whether the
MSSA violated the Fifth Amendment by authorizing the President to
require the registration of males but not females.131 The majority
opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, relied heavily on judicial
deference to Congress in matters of national security and a limited
application of the intermediate scrutiny standard to uphold the
constitutionality of the MSSA.132
Justice Rehnquist began by discussing the great deference the
Court typically gives to Congress as a coequal branch of government,
when it rules on the constitutionality of a congressional act. 133 He
Hasday, supra note 7, at 108 (“[T]he end of the draft in 1973 made the
military more eager to attract women . . . [because of] the need for more military
volunteers.”).
125
Just, supra note 11, at 175.
126
Dietz, supra note 119, at 95.
127
Id.
128
Id..
129
Dunn, supra note 8, at 8.
130
Rotser v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
131
Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1149.
132
Farrington, supra note 6, at 292.
133
Rostker, 453 U.S. 57 at 64.
124
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further noted that, not only is the Court ruling on the constitutionality
of a congressional act, but that the case arises in the context of national
defense and military matters, “and perhaps in no other area has the
Court accorded Congress greater deference.”134 While Justice
Rehnquist did concede that national defense and military matters did
not automatically give Congress deference, he still found that the broad
deference given to Congress in regards to the MSSA was not
overreached.135
In upholding the constitutionality of the act, the majority gave
great weight to the congressional record.136 The majority noted that
Congress’ focus was not on the traditional roles of females, but rather,
the draft’s purpose.137 Congress found that registration with the
Selective Service system was to provide a pool of able-bodied men for
the draft, and the purpose of the draft was to resupply ground troops
for combat.138
Therefore, since women were barred from serving in combat
roles, the majority agreed that only requiring men to register with the
Selective Service System was “substantially related” to the important
military interest in the draft.139 The majority found,
[t]he reason women are exempt from registration is not
because military needs can be met by drafting men.
This is not a case of Congress arbitrarily choosing to
burden one of two similarly situated groups. . . . Men
and women, because of the combat restrictions on
women, are simply not similarly situated for purposes
of a draft or registration for a draft.140
The Court concluded that, “Congress was certainly entitled, in
the exercise of its constitutional powers, to raise and regulate armies
134
135
136
137
138
139
140

Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 70-72.
Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1151-52. See also Kamens, supra note 6, at 716.
Rostker, 453 U.S. 57 at 76.
Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1152-53.
Rostker, 453 U.S. 57 at 76-77.
Id. at 78.
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and navies, to focus on the question of military need rather than
‘equity.’”141 Additionally, the majority went on to reject the idea that
women could instead be drafted to fill non-combat roles because it was
not worth the added burden.142 Volunteers could fill any non-combat
roles, and staffing non-combat roles with only women would be
harmful to military’s need to remain flexible. 143
However, the dissent argued that because the MSSA was
founded on sex-based stereotypes only requiring men to register, the
Selective Service system was unconstitutional.144 Justice Marshall, in
particular, noted that in excluding women from the registration
requirements, the majority, “categorically exclude[ed] women from a
fundamental civic obligation.”145 He argued that even if the Court were
to accept the combat limitation placed on women, there was no reason
to assume that all fillable positions in the event of a draft would be
combat positions.146
Justice Marshall also pointed out that the Department of
Defense had already recognized that in the event of a draft, there
would be a need for support personnel and that women would be
suited to filling those roles.147 Therefore, “there is simply no basis for
concluding in this case that excluding women from registration is
substantially related to the achievement of a concededly important
governmental interest in maintaining an effective defense.”148 Even
though the opinion appeared to be a set-back to women’s equality in
the military, the military continued its slow integration of women as
full service members.149

141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

Id. at 80.
Rostker at 80-81
Rostker at 80-81.
Rostker at 94-95, 100.
Rostker at 86.
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 97-98 (1981).
Rostker, 453 U.S. 57 at 98.
Id. at 90.
Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1156.
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C. The Slow Evolution to Opening Combat Positions to Women
Despite the setback of Rostker, women’s roles in the military
continued to grow in the following years. Women led units in combat
in 1989 in Panama, commanded Navy ships in 1990, and entered
combat zones in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.150 Over
40,000 women served during those operations, with thirteen women
being killed and two taken as prisoners of war.151 These contributions
slowly pushed the national conversation about women’s role in the
military, forcing Congress to begin reconsidering its combat exclusion
policies.
In December 1991, Congress began its slow repeal of its
combat exclusion policies by removing the prohibition on assigning
women to combat aircrafts in all of the branches of the military, as well
as creating the “Commission on the Assignment of Women in the
Armed Forces.”152 The Commission was primarily created to “assess
the laws and policies restricting the assignment of female service
members.”153 Following the creation of the Commission, in 1993,
Congress also removed the separate personnel systems for men and
women and removed the combat ship exclusion.154 However, it was
not a total removal because submarines and many other smaller
combat ships remained closed to women.155
In 1994, the Secretary of Defense Les Aspin issued the Direct
Ground Combat and Assignment Rule memorandum (“Aspin
Memo”), ending the “Risk Rule.” 156 In its place, the Aspin Memo put
Dietz, supra note 119, at 96.
Id. at 96-97.
152
Hasday, supra note 7, at 137.
153
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993
§§541(a), 542(a).
154
Dietz, supra note 119, at 97.
155
Id. at 97.
156
Id. at 97, 98 (the “Risk Rule” prohibited women from entering any units
or positions “if their risks of exposure to direct combat, hostile fire, or capture are
equal to or greater than the risks for land, air, or sea combat units which they are
associated in a theater of operations.”) (quoting Robert T. Herres et al., The
Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, Report
to the President 36 (1992)).
150
151
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forth a new rule, the “direct ground combat assignment rule” to begin
that October.157 The rule provided that “service members are eligible
to be assigned to all positions for which they are qualified, except that
women shall be excluded from assignment to units below the brigade
level whose primary mission is to engage in direct ground combat on
the ground.”158 The new rule defined “direct ground combat” as
Engaging the enemy on the ground with individual or
crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile
fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact
with the hostile force’s personnel. Direct ground
combat takes place well forward on the battlefield
while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat
them by fire, maneuver, or shock effect.159
The policy sought to find a balance between excluding women
from roles with exposure to the enemy while still allowing military
commanders to deploy soldiers in the most effective manner.160
However, Aspin advised that the military services should “use this
guidance to expand opportunities for women” and that “no units or
positions previously open to women [would] be closed under these
instructions.”161
While the “direct ground combat assignment rule” was meant
to keep women from the front lines, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
made it clear that women too were fighting and dying in combat.162 As
a result of these service women’s efforts, the Department of Defense
began conducting a review of its policies in regards to the direct ground

Hasday, supra note 7, at 142.
Id. (quoting Memorandum from Les Aspin, Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of
the Army; Sec’y of the Navy; Sec’y of the Air Force; Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff;
Assistant Sec’y of Def. (Pers. & Readiness); Assistant Sec’y of Def. (Reserve Affairs)
1 (Jan. 13, 1994)). (hereinafter Aspin Memo)
159
Dietz, supra note 119, at 98.
160
Id. at 100, 101.
161
Hasday, supra note 7, at 142 (quoting Aspin Memo at 2).
162
See Dietz, supra note 119, at 102 (discussing how the insurgencies in Iraq
and Afghanistan “non-contiguous nature” meant that all units faced the possibility
of direct ground combat).
157
158
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combat exclusion of women.163 It was not until 2013, however, that
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced that the ban on women
serving in direct ground combat roles would be lifted and began a study
period for full integration into combat units.164 But the announcement
did come with a caveat, it gave senior military officials until 2016 to
request any exemptions to the new policy.165After almost three years
of study, the new Secretary of Defense Ash Carter announced that all
combat jobs would officially be open to women with no exceptions.166
Integration plans therefore had to begin by April 1, 2016. 167
d.

The Aftermath and Resulting Debate

In the three years since the “direct ground combat assignment
rule” was lifted, women have already begun to make inroads into roles
that have traditionally been left to men. Overall, the Army has begun
to make gradual progress towards full gender integration. In April
2015, the first gender integrated Army Ranger School class began
training and by August 2015, Captains Kristen Griest and Shaye Haver
became the first two women to graduate Ranger School.168 As of April
2018, more than 600 women have been recruited for or transferred
into combat positions, 12 women have graduated Ranger School, and
Just, supra note 11, at 175 (discussing how during the War on Terror in
Iraq and Afghanistan over 200,000 women served in combat roles leading to the
DoD’s reconsideration of its policies). See also Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1157
(discussing how over 150 women died, and over 1,000 women were wounded, during
the wars).
164
Id. at 1158.
165
Id.
166
Id. at 1161-62. During the study period, both the Army and the Marine
Corps conducted studies on the success of gender inclusive units. The Army study
found that women were twice as likely to become injured during combat training
than their male peers. Id. at 1158. The Marine study was a nine month long test of
400 male and 100 female Marines and also found that women were twice as likely to
become injured; as well as the fact that all male infantry squads consistently
outperformed gender inclusive squads. Id. at 1158-59. Due to these findings, the
Marine Corps was the one service branch to request an exemption from integrating
females into direct ground combat units, their request was denied. Id. at 1162.
167
Id.
168
Andrew Swick & Emma Moore, The (Mostly) Good News on Women in
Combat, CNAS (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/anupdate-on-the-status-of-women-in-combat.
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over 70 female officers have graduated the infantry or armor officer
courses.169
In contrast, the Marine Corps has not seen as much success
with integration . As of April 2018, women only comprised about eight
percent of the Marine Corps with only ninety-two women serving in
combat arms positions, eleven of which are actually in infantry roles.170
Further, women have struggled to pass the Marine Infantry Officer
Course, with the first woman passing in only September of 2017. 171
While the Marines have retained segregated basic training, in March
2018, the first group of women arrived at the Marine Combat Training
Course after basic training for the first fully integrated unit and
graduated that April.172
Another area where women have struggled to meet the
qualifications for entry has been in Special Operations Forces (“SOF”).
While women have always served in units supporting SOF units, due
to the extreme physical demands women are struggling to qualify for
the SOF units themselves.173 However, there has been some progress
and there remains the possibility of a woman someday serving in a
SOF unit. While no woman has graduated SEAL training, two women
were recruited for the training in 2017,174 and five women have been
selected to begin the pipeline to become Tactical Air Control Party
(“TACP”) specialists in the Air Force. Finally, one female Army officer
has passed the selection process to join the 75th Ranger Regiment,
becoming the first woman to join a special operations unit. 175
Despite these inroads, there are many that still argue that
women should not be allowed to register with the Selective Service
System, let alone serve in direct ground combat units. On February 4,
2016, Representatives Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.) and Ryan Zinke (RMont.), both former service members, introduced the Draft America’s
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Daughters Act of 2016 (“DADA”).176 The Act would have amended
the MSSA to require women, like their male peers, to register with the
Selective Service System upon turning eighteen.177 Congressmen
Hunter and Zinke, however, did not support drafting women and
opposed opening direct combat positions to women.178 They proposed
this bill with the hope that it would trigger a debate in both Congress
and the American public to reconsider women’s inclusion in combat
arms.179 While some discussion in both the House and Senate occurred
on the matter,180 the act was rejected and any policies requiring women
to register with the Selective Service System were removed from the
final version of the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act.181
While Congress has chosen not to address whether women
should be required to register, support for requiring women to register
with the Selective Service System has grown. At the end of his last
term, former President Obama announced his support for requiring
women to register with the Selective Service System as the “next logical
step” for women’s equality in the military. 182 Even Secretary of the
Army, John McHugh, General Mark A. Milley, Chief of Staff of the
Army, and General Robert B. Neller, Marine Corps Commandant,
have acknowledged that the last step to formal equality in the military
is women registering for the draft.183 According to General Neller,
Fromer, supra note 1, at 175.
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
The Senate version of the Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense
Authorization Act, which in part funds the Selective Service System, even had an
amendment that required women to register. Id.
181
Id. at 176. While Congress has chosen not to address this issue, since this
comment has been submitted for publication, Judge Gray Miller for the District
Court for the Southern District of Texas, Huston Division, has ruled that an all-male
military draft is unconstitutional. See National Coalition for Men v. Selective Service System,
355 F.Supp.3d 568 (S.D. Tex. 2019).
182
Gregory Korte & Tom Vanden Brook, White House: Obama Supports
Registering Women for Military Draft, USA TODAY (Dec. 1, 2016),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/12/01/obama-supportsregistering-women-military-draft/90449708/.
183
Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1165-66. As John McHugh stated in regards to
women in the military, “if your objective is true and pure equality then you have to
look at all aspects.” In the time since this comment was submitted for publication,
176
177
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“[n]ow that the restrictions that exempted women from [direct ground
combat] don’t exist, then you’re a citizen of a United States . . . It
doesn’t mean you’re going to serve, but you go register.”184
III. PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY IN ISRAELI AND AMERICAN LAW
When examining the right to equality, one must assess two
different approaches. The first is the formal equality approach, which
defines equality as equal treatment of people that are categorically
alike.185 Second, the essential equality approach relies on the premise
that formal equality is not sufficient to achieve complete equality. This
view surmises formal equality is not sufficient because it does not
account for the fact that life imposes different conditions on
individuals affecting their ability to achieve success. 186 Therefore,
essential equality seeks to equalize disparate conditions so that each
individual has a chance at social mobility.187 While both American and
Israeli approaches to sex equality rely on formal equality, Israeli law
also relies on essential equality through affirmative action in both
economic and social spheres.188
A. Principles of Equality in Israeli Law
Since Israel’s independence, the state has taken steps towards
implementing gender equality through both legislation and regulatory
actions covering both the public and private realms of Israeli society.189
The first document to acknowledge women as legal persons who
deserve equal treatment was the 1948 Declaration of Independence.190
The Declaration states that Israel, “will ensure the complete equality
of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion,

General Neller retired and General Milley assumed the duties of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
184
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185
Schafferman, supra note 84.
186
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187
Id.
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Id.
189
Id.
190
Eisenstadt, supra note 43, at 365.
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race or sex.”191 However, this was merely a symbolic step towards
gender equality because the Declaration of Independence bears no
constitutional weight.192 Therefore, the statement is only a guiding
principle of Israeli law rather than a legal mandate.
But the Israeli government has passed other legislation in
support of gender equality. In addition to the Declaration of
Independence’s commitment to gender equality, Israel has passed the
Women’s Equal Rights Law of 1951, “to ensure women’s equality in
the legal system, ‘in the spirit of principles states in the Declaration of
Independence.’”193 The goal of this law is to ensure that every woman
has a dignified existence through guaranteeing access to “equality in
employment, basic and higher education, health, housing,” as well as a
woman’s right over her body and to be protected from violence and
sexual abuse.194 However, the law is flawed in that it does not protect
rights within families, it does not specify how equal pay or social rights
will be achieved, and, because it is not a Basic Law (the Israeli
equivalent to the Constitution), it does not have superior status in the
law.195
In practice, the legal system seeks to achieve equality through
an “equality through difference” approach that purports to
“appreciat[e] and accomodat[e] differences” between the sexes.196 This
plays out through provisions in the law aimed at protecting women
through creating privileges and exemptions, like legally mandated
maternity leave and exemptions from military service. 197 This special
treatment of women is seen as equalizing socially unequal situations,
while still protecting the societal need for women as mothers and
caregivers.198

191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198

Schafferman, supra note 84.
Eisenstadt, supra note 43, at 366.
Schafferman, supra note 84.
Id.
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A woman’s ability to contribute as a mother and caregiver is
central to the law because Israeli society was formed around a
collectivist ideology where an individual attains status, rights, and
privileges through their contribution to the society.199 The law did not
develop around individual rights, but rather on how each individual
could best contribute to society.200 A woman’s ability to reproduce was
seen as a woman’s “incomparable and unique contribution as citizens
of their state.”201 Therefore, the legal system was shaped around
allowing women’s opportunities in the workplace while still
“encouraging service to the state through motherhood.”202
Women’s mandatory military service is a good illustration of
the seemingly contradictory commitment to gender equality through
preserving the woman’s place as a mother. In mandating mandatory
military services for both men and women the state of Israel took a
revolutionary step towards gender equality. But by providing
exemptions to service for women centered around their familial role,
the state also made it clear that the priority for all Israeli women should
be motherhood.203 “This exemption from military service,. . . . [is]
justified by the acknowledgement that women have a role in Israeli
society that is, at times, considered more important than that of a
worker—women as wives and mothers.”204
This is why Israel has developed a legal system combining both
formal and essential equality. If Israel had adopted a purely formal
equality regime, special treatment of women through privileges and
Id. at 397.
Id. at 399.
201
Id. at 404.
202
Id. at 404-05.
203
Id. at 378-79.
204
Leora F. Eisenstadt, Privileged but Equal? A Comparison of U.S. and Israeli
Notions of Sex Equality in Employment Law, 40 Vand, J. Transnat’l L. 357, 379 (2007).
It should also be stated that while many in the United States would find such
treatment of women as highly discriminatory; women as a wives and mothers are
often highly revered in Israeli society. “Indeed women’s roles in reproduction have
been compared with and seen as complementary to the male role in the military.”
Ukeles, supra note 17, at 342. Therefore presenting Israeli women as less-than in
Israeli society would not be portraying a completely accurate picture of the societal
dynamics there.
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exemptions would fail to protect women’s primary roles as mothers.205
Thus, gender equality in Israel will only go so far as maintaining
women’s place as mothers because “[t]he notion of equality itself is a
social product, constructed out of already existing ideologies, practices
and structures. The laws and legal theories that enforce a notion of
equality tend to both reflect these already existing social norms and
reproduce them.”206 However, in light of women’s status in the IDF,
it’s questionable whether these privileges and exemptions actually
operate to a woman’s benefit.
B. Equality in American Law
In contrast to Israel, American conceptions of gender equality
focus on a theory of “sameness” between the sexes. This theory seeks
to remove gender discrimination through “the removal of barriers to
equal achievement and the eradication of discrimination.”207 This is
achieved through the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
When examining Equal Protection challenges, the Supreme
Court has used three standards of review. The highest standard is the
strict scrutiny standard, where if a piece of “legislation implicates a
fundamental right or a suspect class of persons, courts will strike down
the law unless it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest.”208 A much lower standard is rational basis review. Under
rational basis review, if legislation “does not implicate a fundamental
right or a suspect class of “discrete and insular minorities, courts will
uphold the law so long as there is a rational basis for it.”209
The third standard, which falls in between strict scrutiny and
rational basis, is called intermediate scrutiny and is used to evaluate
laws that have gender classifications. 210 Intermediate scrutiny
developed out of the recognition that “sex, as an unalterable trait,
205
206
207
208
209
210

Eisenstadt, supra note 43, at 405.
Id. at 394.
Id. at 362.
Farrington, supra note 6, at 284 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Fromer, supra note 1, at 183.
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should be considered a suspect classification under the Equal
Protection Clause.”211 Under the intermediate scrutiny standard, “a law
that distinguishes between individuals on the basis of sex must be
substantially related to an important government objective,”212 and the
court must also determine “whether there is a way to further the State’s
interest in a sex neutral way.”213
While Craig v. Boren214 was the first Supreme Court case to apply
the intermediate scrutiny standard to a gender-based classification,215
arguably United States v. Virginia216 is the most famous, and for this
comment, the most useful case to apply the intermediate scrutiny
standard. In United States v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that the
State of Virginia and the Virginia Military Institute’s (“VMI”) exclusion
of women violated the Equal Protection Clause and mandated that the
school open its doors to women.217 At the time, VMI was the only
single-sex university of Virginia’s fifteen public colleges and
universities.218 VMI’s curriculum focused on creating “citizen soldiers”
through an “adversative” method of education.219 VMI did not accept
female applicants because “coeducation would materially affect at least
three aspects of VMI’s program—physical training, the absence of
privacy, and the adversative approach.”220 However, the court found
that while in certain circumstances physical differences between men
Farrington, supra note 6, at 285 (internal quotations omitted). See generally
Id. at 283-86 (explaining the history behind the development of the intermediate
scrutiny standard).
212
Id. at 286. The intermediate scrutiny test therefore is a middle group
between strict scrutiny and rational basis. Fromer, supra note 1, at 183.
213
Fromer, supra note 1, at 184.
214
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
215
Farrington, supra note 6, at 286.
216
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
217
Fromer, supra note 1, at 185. Although not discussed for purposes of this
comment, the Supreme Court also held that Virginia’s proffered program for women
at Mary Baldwin College did not cure the constitutional violation. Virginia, 518 U.S.
at 517.
218
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 520.
219
Id. at 521-22.
220
Id. at 540 (“VMI’s adversative method of training provides educational
benefits that cannot be made available, unmodified, to women. Alterations to
accommodate women would necessarily be radical . . . as to transform, indeed
destroy, VMI’s program.”) (internal quotations omitted).
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and women may justify differential treatment, such differential
treatment “must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the
different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.”221
Therefore, in rejecting Virginia’s argument that VMI’s methodology
would be unsuitable for most women, the court found:
Generalizations about “the way women are,” estimates
of what is appropriate for most women, no longer justify
denying opportunity to women whose talent and
capacity place them outside the average description.
Notably, Virginia never asserted that VMI’s method of
education suits most men. . . . In contrast to the
generalizations about women on which Virginia rests,
we note again . . . VMI’s “implementing methodology”
is not “inherently unsuitable to women.”222
The Court’s opinion clarified that generalizations about most
men and most women would no longer be sufficient to justify
differential treatment and made it clear that gender based
classifications would have difficulty carrying any legal weight.
In addition to opening the doors of VMI to women, United
States v. Virginia also further clarified the legal analysis required under
the intermediate scrutiny test. The Court ruled that under the
intermediate scrutiny standard, “[p]arties that seek to defend genderbased governmental action must demonstrate an ‘exceedingly
persuasive justification’ for that action.”223 Further, the court ruled that
an “exceedingly persuasive” justification is a high standard that rests
solely with the proponent of the classification to demonstrate.224 For
the proponent to meet this burden, it must show that “at least the
challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and
that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives.”225 Additionally, those justifications
“must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents,
221
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capacities, or preferences of males and females.”226 In light of this
standard, Rostker, and its “fixed notions” about women, should be
called into question.
IV. THE REQUIREMENT TO REGISTER FOR THE DRAFT SHOULD APPLY
TO BOTH MEN AND WOMEN IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE EQUALITY IN THE
LAW

A. Women’s Selective Service Registration and a Parental
Exemption Would be Consistent with the Equal Protection
Clause
With the above principles in mind, in order for American
women to achieve full equality and share the burden of citizenship they
should be required to register with Selective Service System. However,
in order to protect the important State interest in the wellbeing of
children and families, a parental exception should be added to allow
both mothers and fathers to opt out of registering with the Selective
Service System. To do so will give full weight to the Equal Protection
Clause, allow women to share the burden of citizenship, and protect
children and families.
Should women’s draft exclusion be challenged, it does not
appear the government would be able to present an “exceedingly
persuasive justification” for such disparate treatment of men and
women. In regards to women’s draft exclusion there no longer remains
an “important government objective” in which the “discriminatory
means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.
Here, the important government objective is ensuring there is
an able-bodied pool of individuals available in the event of a draft to
replace fallen ground troops. The method to ensure this pool is
registration with the Selective Service System. However, through this
method the government discriminates between men and women in
requiring men, but not women, to register. In Rostker, the Supreme
Court rejected a challenge to women’s draft exclusion because men
226
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and women were not “similarly situated” in regards to a draft because
women could not serve in combat roles.227 However, after December
2015, all positions in the military are open to women,228 removing the
main motivating factor behind the Rostker decision.
Now that women are no longer excluded from combat arms
positions, it is clear that the “discriminatory means employed” are no
longer “substantially related” to the achievement of an important
governmental objective. Women and men are now “similarly situated”
for the purposes of a draft, and therefore the “added burden” of
including women in the registration system is no longer present.
However, an argument could be made that the $8.5 million
needed for the first year to register women, in addition to the $23
million already in the Selective Service System’s budget, would be too
cost prohibitive.229 But, an argument based solely on administrative
concerns is not viable. If maintaining the Selective Service System truly
is cost prohibitive then it is within Congress’ powers to abolish it
completely. While abolishing the Selective Service System may be a
better alternative to a gender-inclusive draft, if registration remains in
place, it cannot continue to discriminate between men and women.
Even though administrative and fiscal concerns are strong arguments
to dissolve the Selective Service System, they are not viable arguments
to continue women’s draft exclusion in the face of intermediate
scrutiny.230
However, to prevent a disruption within families in the event
a draft is reinstituted, the government would not be in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause to include a parental exemption from
registration with the Selective Service System. If such an exemption
were only available for mothers, it is unclear whether such a distinction
between mothers and fathers would survive intermediate scrutiny.
See generally Rostker, 453 U.S. at 76-78.
Just, supra note 11, at 1161-62.
229
Fromer, supra note 1, at 185.
230
Id. C.f. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 78-79. The Court probably would have found
administrative convince insufficient to justify draft exclusion because the main focus
of the opinion was that men and women differently situated when it came to combat
inclusion.
227
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Further, such a distinction would place the burden of child care solely
on the mother, which could reinforce “overbroad generalizations
about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and
females.”231
B. A Parental Exemption from Selective Service Registration Would
be Integral to Promoting Gender Equality in the U.S.
In Israel, “overbroad generalizations about the different
talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females”232 is expected
in the legal system. The law is designed around affording women
privileges and exemptions from certain duties in order to preserve their
roles as mothers.233 In the military, it means shorter terms of service
and exemptions from mandatory service if the woman is married,
pregnant, or has children.234 While in theory, this may appear to be a
positive step towards protecting women, it instead works to the
detriment of women in two key ways. First, it perpetuates the
stereotype that women are the sole caregivers within a family, instead
of acknowledging the role a father could play in rearing his children.235
Second, in limiting women’s service in the military, the law is actively
removing the main avenue for advancement in Israeli society 236 and
“serves to lessen the value on women’s citizenship.”237
This parallels America’s draft laws and highlights why an
exemption from registration with the Selective Service System must be
afforded to both mothers and fathers. Both mandatory military service
and registering for the draft have the same underlying principles. One,
to provide a pool of able-bodied individuals to protect the nation and
two, to instill civic responsibility in the nation’s citizens. However, in
distinguishing between men and women, Israel’s service laws have
unintended consequences for women. Therefore, if a parental
exemption from registration is not included, the Selective Service
231
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System will have the same discriminatory results seen in Israel. If
women could opt out of registering because they were mothers, the
onus would be placed on women to care and raise children in the event
of a draft. Further, it would signal that women’s service to their country
is secondary to men, devaluing their citizenship and their ability to
contribute to society.
Therefore, should women become draft eligible, a parental
exemption from registration would protect the strong state interest in
preserving families in the event a draft is reinstituted. Further, it avoids
the paternalistic results seen in Israel that work to the detriment of
women’s inclusion in society. A parental exemption would prevent
women from being forced into a maternal role and would allow them
to actively participate in one of America’s most revered institutions.
Additionally, such an exemption would pass the intermediate
scrutiny test because it acknowledges the role mothers and fathers play
in raising children avoiding “overbroad generalizations about the
different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.”238
Further, it would allow the parents to decide together who should raise
their children, rather than defaulting to the traditional conception that
mothers are the only caregivers. Thus, a parental exemption to the
draft would be integral to promoting gender equality in the United
States.
V. CONCLUSION
Women’s service in Israel’s and the United States’ militaries has
evolved over time to the point where women in both militaries can
serve side by side with their male peers. Given both the practical and
symbolic importance of both militaries, this could be seen as a
testament to the commitment both nations have made towards greater
gender equality. However, in distinguishing between the service
requirements of men and women, Israel’s laws work to the detriment
of its women. While this may be an acceptable outcome in Israel, to
protect a woman’s place as a mother, such disparate treatment of men
and women is unacceptable in the United States. Therefore, if the U.S.
238
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is truly committed to gender equality, the disparate treatment of men
and women in draft registration cannot continue. In order to give full
weight to the equal protection clause, men and women must both be
required to register with the Selective Service System. To do otherwise
would be to impermissibly discriminate between men and women. To
take the U.S.’s commitment to gender equality even further, a parental
exemption should be included to Selective Service registration, to
afford mothers or fathers the choice to raise their children. To do so
would further the principles of the equal protection clause and would
prevent “overbroad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities, or preferences of males and females.”239
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